PEOPLE V JOHNSON
39 N.Y.3d 93 (2022)
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Issue:
Whether a pre-indictment delay of eight years violated the defendant’s Due Process rights and his constitutional right to a speedy trial in a multi-count indictment.
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Holding:
In Applying the five factors in People v. Taranovich, the Court of Appeals held that when an indictment contains multiple counts, if delay impacts the defendant’s ability to defend one count, it may weaken that defendant’s position in plea bargaining, potentially adversely impacting the resulting plea. Thus, the court must consider prejudice measured against all counts pending when the dismissal motion is made, not merely against the crime of conviction.
The New York Court of Appeals Interpreting The Taranovich Factors
Analysis:
The Taranovich framework is a holistic one—that is, “no one factor or combination of the factors . . . is necessarily decisive or determinative of the speedy trial claim” (37 NY2d at 445). We have also noted that the factors must be evaluated “on an ad hoc basis” (id.)—meaning that the analysis must be tailored to the facts of each case. Here, although reciting the Taranovich factors and correctly acknowledging our subsequent case law expounding on those factors, the Appellate Division deviated from our Taranovich framework in several significant ways.
With respect to the first factor, the length of delay, as we explained in Taranovich itself, while the greater the delay, the{**39 NY3d at 97} more likely the harm to the defendant, there is no specific length of time that automatically results in a due process violation (id. at 445-446). The Appellate Division noted that “the parties agree that the first factor favors defendant” (193 AD3d at 1430).
As to the second factor, reasons for delay, these will vary from case to case, but we have explained that “a determination made in good faith to defer commencement of the prosecution for further investigation or for other sufficient reasons, will not deprive the defendant of due process of law even though the delay may cause some prejudice to the defense” (People v Singer, 44 NY2d 241, 254 [1978]; People v Wiggins, 31 NY3d 1, 13 [2018]; People v Decker, 13 NY3d 12, 14 [2009]; Vernace, 96 NY2d at 888). The Appellate Division “assume[d], arguendo, that the People failed to establish ‘good cause’ for the ‘protracted’ preindictment delay” (193 AD3d at 1430). However, some examination of the reason for the delay is required. Instead of attempting to evaluate the good faith reasons for the various periods of delay, the Appellate Division‘s conclusion that the second factor favored Mr. Johnson is based upon an assumption for the sake of argument.
Turning to the third factor, the “nature” of the underlying crime can refer to both its severity and, relatedly, the complexity and challenges of investigating the crime and gathering evidence to support a prosecution (see Singer, 44 NY2d at 254; People v Staley, 41 NY2d 789, 792 [1977]). For example, in Taranovich, we noted that a prosecutor may need to be more thorough in preparing for a felony trial, as opposed to a misdemeanor (37 NY2d at 446). A few other relevant considerations include the availability and willingness of witnesses to testify or the availability and quality of evidence (see e.g. Decker, 13 NY3d at 15). Here, the Appellate Division held that its assumption that the People lacked good cause compelled the result that the “third factor[ ] favor[s] defendant” (193 AD3d at 1430). The crime here—the sexual assault of a minor found unresponsive on a city street—is quite serious. The nature of the crime here is directly related to the issues of complexity and may, therefore, account for some of the delay: the victim’s severe intoxication and lack of memory of the assault rendered her unable to identify her attacker. It is not clear on what basis the Court concluded that its assumption of lack of good faith led to the conclusion that the third factor favored Mr. Johnson, but that conclusion, apparently based solely on that{**39 NY3d at 98} assumption with no analysis of the relevant concerns, is not supportable.
As to factor four (extended pretrial incarceration), Mr. Johnson was not incarcerated pretrial. He was, for some time between the crime and the indictment, incarcerated on a wholly unrelated matter, which time would not count under this factor.
In analyzing factor five, the Appellate Division held that because Mr. Johnson pleaded guilty only to rape in the second degree (Penal Law § 130.30 [1]), which depends solely on the age difference between the defendant and the victim, “the preindictment delay could not have ‘impaired’ defendant’s ability to defend himself on the charge of which he was convicted” (193 AD3d at 1431). This was error. When an indictment contains multiple counts, if delay impacts the defendant’s ability to defend one count, it may weaken that defendant’s position in plea bargaining, potentially adversely impacting the resulting plea.[FN3] Thus, the appellate court must consider prejudice measured against all counts pending when the dismissal motion is made, not merely against the crime of conviction.
The Appellate Division here misinterpreted the Taranovich framework and its factual and legal review should be made under the proper framework. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division insofar as appealed from should be reversed and the case remitted to the Appellate Division for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Summary of the Facts:
The case of People v Johnson, 2022 NY Slip Op 06537 [39 NY3d 92], revolves around the issue of pre-indictment delay. In 2006, Ronald K. Johnson was accused of sexually assaulting a 14-year-old girl. However, the indictment of Mr. Johnson did not occur until almost eight years later. The case is based on the interpretation of the test set out in People v Taranovich (37 NY2d 442 [1975]), which outlines the factors to be considered when deciding if pretrial delays amount to a violation of the right to a speedy trial. The Appellate Division interpreted the test in a manner that the Court of Appeals deemed incorrect. As a result, the decision of the Appellate Division was reversed.
The events leading to the delay in Mr. Johnson’s indictment began with the police finding the victim lying on the street, intoxicated and unresponsive. She had been given alcohol by a 15-year-old male she met that night, known as “Shamer.” The victim stated that she did not remember anything after she started drinking. The Rochester Police Department (RPD) submitted the victim’s clothing and the evidence collected through the sexual assault kit to the Monroe County Crime Laboratory the day after her admission to the hospital. While the victim was still recovering in the hospital, RPD officers interviewed her again. She identified the person with whom she was drinking as “Shamer.” However, she did not identify anyone in the photo arrays containing a picture of Shamer.
The RPD attempted to contact Shamer, but he was no longer living at the address they had for him. After no further leads, the RPD moved the case to “office” status in January of 2007. In November 2007, thirteen months after receipt by the Monroe County Crime Laboratory, the forensic biologist processed the victim’s sexual assault kit and clothing. DNA testing showed that the samples taken from the victim matched the DNA profile in CODIS for Mr. Johnson. The laboratory notified the police, and the RPD reopened the case in April 2010.
The investigator assigned to the case attempted to contact the victim twice but was unsuccessful. The investigator closed the case in January 2011, stating that the victim was uncooperative. In December 2012, the investigator received a call from a colleague, whose wife worked as a counselor for the victim. The victim had told her counselor that she wanted to pursue the case. The investigator met with the victim, who identified a potential assailant from a photo array but not Mr. Johnson. The investigator was then out of the office for six weeks due to an injury.
In August 2013, the case was assigned to an assistant district attorney (ADA). The ADA attempted to call the victim several times but was unsuccessful. In October, he recruited another investigator to find the victim, and she identified Mr. Johnson as her assailant from a photo array. A DNA sample was obtained from Mr. Johnson, and the ADA scheduled a grand jury presentation for February 14. The victim was subpoenaed to appear but arrived several hours late, and the ADA did not present the case to the grand jury.
The Court of Appeals clarified the interpretation of the Taranovich factors in relation to pre-indictment delay. The factors to be weighed are (1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying charges; (4) whether or not there has been prejudice to the defendant as a result of the delay; and (5) whether or not the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial. The court emphasized that no one factor is determinative and that the analysis must be viewed as a whole.