People v Holz
NY Slip Op 02682 [35 NY3d 55]; 35 NY3d at 57
Decided on May 7, 2020
Issue:
Does a Guilty Plea Preclude Appellate Review Of A Ruling On A Suppression Motion Where The Count Regarding The Suppression Motion Was Satisfied By A Guilty Plea But Was Not The Count To Which Defendant Pled?
Whether CPL § 710.70 (2), regarding reviews of motions to suppress, grants a defendant the right to review of a suppression decision when the order related exclusively to a count that was satisfied by a guilty plea but was not one to which the defendant pleaded guilty.
Holding:
Guilty Plea Does Not Preclude Right to Review of a Suppression Motion
The Court of Appeals held that CPL § 710.70 grants defendants the right to review a count to which was satisfied by a guilty plea but where defendant did not plead guilty to that count.
Facts:
Police received a tip that a man walking near the site of a burglary two days prior may have been involved in the crime. Acting on the tip, an officer stopped defendant Holz and directed him to remove his hands from his pockets. Holz held a plastic bag of jewelry, which he said he bought from a yard sale at a nearby house. Holz agreed to accompany the officers to the house to confirm the purchase, but the homeowner denied owning or selling the jewelry. Defendant was arrested 30 minutes after the initial stop, and charged with two counts of burglary in the second degree. The first count related to a laptop computer that was stolen, the second related to the jewelry. Defendant moved to suppress the jewelry, arguing that his detention and seizure violated his right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. Following a suppression hearing, Supreme Court denied Holz’s motion, concluding that the police had reasonable suspicion.
Defendant pled guilty to count one of burglary in the second degree, in satisfaction of the entire indictment, which included the count two charge relating to the jewelry—the subject of defendant’s motion to suppress. Defendant was sentenced to six years’ incarceration plus five years’ post release supervision. Defendant then appealed from the judgement, contending that the Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to suppress the jewelry. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that “the judgement of conviction on appeal here did not ensue from the denial of the motion to suppress and the latter is, therefore, not reviewable pursuant to CPL 710.70 (2).”
Analysis:
Interpreting the Statute
CPL § 710.70 states that, “an order finally denying a motion to suppress evidence may be reviewed upon an appeal from an ensuing judgement of conviction notwithstanding the fact that such judgement is entered upon a plea of guilty.” According to the Appellate Division, defendant’s plea did not “ensue from” the suppression order because the evidence sought to be suppressed related only to the jewelry count, to which the defendant did not plead guilty.
But the Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the Appellate Division erred in concluding that it was jurisdictionally precluded from reviewing the suppression order, given the plain meaning of statute. Though the term “ensuing judgement of conviction” is not defined in the statute, the ordinary meaning of “ensure’ is “to take place afterward or as a result.” In using such a word, the legislature chose the broadest of relational terms to convey the connection between the suppression order and the judgement of conviction, making clear that CPL 710.70 provides for appellate review of a suppression order relating to a count in an accusatory instrument satisfied by a guilty plea.
The Court of Appeals explained that the legislative history of the statute supports this logic, as a defendant’s right to appellate review of a suppression order was first granted in 1962 when the legislature added a subdivision to the former Code of Criminal Procedure stating that, “if the
[suppression]
motion is denied, the order denying such may be reviewed on appeal from a judgement of conviction notwithstanding the fact that such judgement of conviction is predicated upon a plea of guilty” (Code Crim Pro § 813-; see Bill Jacket, L 1962, ch 954). The original provision granting this right to appellate review did not contain the term “ensuing” or place any restrictions on the relation between the suppression order and the judgement of conviction, and when the Code of Criminal Procedure was replaced in 1971 with the Criminal Procedure Law, a defendant’s right to appellate review of a suppression order, despite pleading guilty, remained unchanged. The Court of Appeals therefore reversed the decision of the Appellate Division and remitted to that court to make a determination on the motion to suppress on its merits.