People v Mendoza
NY Slip Op 04758
Decided on June 13, 2019
Issue:
Defendant Argues Ineffective Assistance for Counsel’s Jury Nullification Strategy
Whether defendant Mendoza’s counsel was ineffective where, at trial, he advanced a jury nullification argument, which is “not a legally sanctioned function of the jury.”
Holding:
Record Does not Support Ineffective Assistance Claim
The Court of Appeals held that counsel’s representation, when viewed as a whole, did not constitute ineffective assistance.
Facts:
Defendant twice unlawfully entered a multi-residential apartment building and stole packages from the mailbox area in the lobby. The items stolen were dog training pads and two pairs of pants. Defendant admitted to police that he was the man in the surveillance video footage from the building. The defendant was charged with two counts of burglary in the second degree, burglary in the third degree, petit larceny, and trespass.
At trial, defense counsel declared the case was “no great mystery,” and that it was “rock-solid” because the crimes were captured on video. He iterated that he was not asking the jury to find the defendant “not guilty” of the burglary charges but only to be fair. Defense counsel argued that stealing “doggy diapers and a pair of pants” is not “the crime of the century” and thus could not be considered burglary. Counsel concluded by describing the charges in the case as “over exaggerated,” and said that he had been “fighting for” the defendant for more than a year while imploring the jury to join that fight with him. The People objected to this comment and it was sustained.
The court instructed the jury “to apply the law to the facts” and “not be governed or influenced by sympathy or prejudice for or against any party,” and described the elements of the crimes and relevant definitions. The jury convicted the defendant of both second-degree burglary and petit larceny.
On appeal, the defendant argued ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel conceded appellant’s guilt on all counts when he pursued a jury nullification defense. Appellate Division rejected the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that “defense counsel pursued a reasonable strategy and provided meaningful representation.”
Analysis:
Proving Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
A defendant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed by Federal and State Constitutions (see US Const, 6th Amend; NY Const, art I § 6). A defendant carries the burden of proving that they were deprived of a fair trial by less than “meaningful representation,” which is determined by an examination of “the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation” (People v Oliveras, 21 NY3d 339, 346 [2013], quoting People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]. Counsel’s performance is evaluated to determine if it was consistent with that of a reasonably competent attorney.
‘Mercy-Dispensing Power’ Not Legally Sanctioned Function of a Jury
Defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective because he repeatedly noted Mendoza’s guilt on all counts and pursued a jury nullification defense instead of other viable defenses. In People v Goetz (73 NY2d 751 [1988]), the Court held that the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury that if it found that the People had proved each of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, it “must find the defendant guilty” because “the jury’s function is to apply the legal definition of the crime to the evidence and to convict if it is satisfied that each of the elements of the crime has been established…” (73 NY2d at 752). The Court further explained in that case that although there is nothing to prevent a jury from acquitting a defendant even after that the prosecution has successfully proven its case, “this so-called ‘mercy-dispensing power’…is not a legally sanctioned function of the jury and should not be encouraged by the court.” (id.)
In People v Weinberg, the Court of Appeals concluded that the defendant’s argument that “he should have been permitted by the trial court to present the concept of jury nullification during summation is foreclosed by our holding in People v Goetz” (83 NY2d 262, 268 [1994]. The Court explained that “permitting defense counsel instead to encourage the jury to abdicate its primary function would directly contravene the trial court’s authority, recognized in Goetz, to instruct the jury that they must follow and properly apply the law.” (id.)
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held in this case that when viewed in totality, it could not affirm that defendant Mendoza was provided with less than meaningful representation. Given the “truly overwhelming” evidence against his client, counsel raised what he reasonably perceived to be factual issues in the case and took the strategy of jury nullification. The trial court did not curb counsel’s jury nullification summation arguments, and as a result, the defendant failed to sustain his burden that he was deprived of meaningful representation. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed.