People v. Torres, People v. Lewis
2021 NY Slip Op 05448
NY Court of Appeals
Decided on October 12, 2021
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Issue:
Does City Law Violate Due Process?
Whether New York City’s Right of Way Law 1) violates due process by employing an “ordinary negligence” mens rea and 2) whether the statute is preempted by state law.
Holding:
Right of Way Law Does Not Violate Due Process, Does not Conflict with State Law
The NY Court of Appeals held that the Right of Way Law 1) does not violate due process as “ordinary negligence” is a clearly defined mens rea, and 2) the law does not conflict with state law.
Facts:
In People v Torres, 65 Misc 3d 19, 22-23 [App Term, 1st Dept 2019], defendant made a right turn into a crosswalk where he struck and killed a pedestrian who had the “WALK” signal in her favor. In People v Lewis, 2019 NY Slip Op 51711[U] *1 [App Term, 1st Dept 2019], defendant drove a bus into a bicyclist, causing fatal injuries. Each defendant was charged with violating the Right of Way Law, a misdemeanor, and Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 (c)(1), a traffic infraction. Both defendants moved to dismiss the charge of violating the Right of Way Law, arguing that the law’s ordinary negligence mens rea violates due process because the standard is impermissibly vague and legally insufficient for imposing criminal liability.
Defendants also made two preemption arguments, claiming that the Right of Way Law impermissibly punishes more harshly the same conduct proscribed by Vehicle and Traffic Law §1146, and that the law’s use of ordinary negligence as a culpable mental state is prohibited by article 15 of the Penal Law. The Appellate Term adopted the same analysis in each case: it rejected these arguments and affirmed the order.
Analysis:
Due Process Challenge Fails
The defendants argue that State and Federal Constitutions require more than ordinary negligence as a culpable mental state for imposing criminal liability, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Elonis v United States (575 US 723 [2015]). The Court of Appeals explained, however, that the Supreme Court “has never articulated a general constitutional doctrine of mens rea” (Powell v Texas, 392 US 514, 535 [1968]), and that Elonis differs from this case in that it involved a federal statute that was silent as to any mens rea. Indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld strict liability offenses, which require no culpable mental state, and has recognized the validity of “public welfare offenses” that do not require a showing of any mens rea. Furthermore, the legislature has enacted laws outside the Penal Law that impose criminal liability based on ordinary negligence, such as the Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 that imposes criminal liability on a driver who, while failing to exercise due care, collides with a pedestrian or bicyclist and causes either physical injury, or the Agriculture and Markets Law § 370 that imposes criminal liability on an owner of a dangerous animal who fails to exercise due care in protecting the public from such animal.
Mens Rea Standard Not Vague
The Court’s test for determining if “a law possesses the certainty and definiteness mandated by due process is whether the language of the statute would indicate to reasonable persons the nature of the conduct it proscribes” (People v Hardy, 4 NY2d 500, 505 [1979]). The Court noted in People v Grogan (260 NY 138 [1932]), that “the path has been pretty well cut out and emblazoned along which a [person] must proceed to avoid the charge of negligence. A statute…which made ‘negligent’ driving…causing injury or danger to another, a ‘misdemeanor’ would…be constitutional.” The Court of Appeals held, therefore, that defendants’ vagueness claim fails.
Preemption Doctrine and Penal Law Definitions of Culpability
A local government is constitutionally empowered to enact local laws, but those laws may not be inconsistent with the New York State Constitution or any general law of the state (People v Diack, 24 NY3d 674, 678-679 [2015]). Although broad, the law-making power of local governments is limited by the “preemption doctrine.” Defendants argue that the City was prohibited by certain provisions of the Penal Law and the Vehicle and Traffic Law from enacting a law that imposes criminal liability based on a mens rea not enumerated in article 15 of the Penal Law, which defines four culpable mental states—intentionally, knowingly, recklessly and criminal negligence—as a basis for criminal liability.
The Court of Appeals noted, however, that strict liability is also contemplated by article 15: “the minimal requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act which [such person] is physically capable of performing” and “if such conduct is all that is required for commission of a particular offense…such offense is one of ‘strict liability’” (Penal Law § 15.10). Furthermore, the Court explained that the two provisions at issue, Penal Law § 15.00 (Culpability; definitions of terms) and § 15.05 (Culpability; definition of culpable mental states) expressly make clear that they are “applicable to this chapter” only. The four mens rea defined by article 15 are not, therefore, an exhaustive list of the possible mens rea resulting in criminal liability.
Conflict Preemption Doctrine
The defendants also argue that the Right of Way Law conflicts with the state law, but the Vehicle and Traffic Law authorizes New York City to pass laws relating to “traffic on or pedestrian use of any highway,” including “right of way of vehicles and pedestrians.” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1642 [a][10]). For a local law to be invalid pursuant to the conflict preemption doctrine, the State must specifically permit the conduct the local law prohibits or provide “some other indication that deviation from state law is prohibited” (Garcia v New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 31 NY3d 601, 617-618 [2018]). The Right of Way Law imposes liability on a driver who physically injures a pedestrian or bicyclist while failing to exercise due care—the state law does not permit this conduct, and there is no indication that the City is constrained in prohibiting it (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146 [b][1]). Whereas the City law creates a misdemeanor offense for first-time offenders and the state law creates only a traffic infraction, the Court of Appeals has held that a local law’s imposition of a stricter penalty than a state law does not amount to a conflict for preemption purposes (see Zakrzewska v New School, 14 NY3d 469, 480 [2010]). The Right of Way Law does not, then, conflict with the state law, and the order of the Appellate Term was affirmed in each case.