Jury Instructions Muddle Definition of Crime, ‘Seriously Prejudice’ Defendant

Jury Instructions Muddle Definition of Crime, ‘Seriously Prejudice’ Defendant

People v Lamb

NY Slip Op 07057

NY Court of Appeals

Decided on December 16, 2021

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Issue:

Jury Instructions Sever Required Link between Elements of Crime

Whether defendant Lamb is entitled to a new trial after the lower court gave the jury supplemental instructions that muddled the definition of the crime, not only as to jurisdiction, but also as to the sufficiency of evidence of guilt of sex trafficking.

Holding:

Instructions So Prejudiced Defendant as to Warrant a New Trial

The Court of Appeals held that defendant’s sex trafficking conviction should be vacated and a new trial ordered as the Supreme Court’s supplemental jury instructions incorrectly severed the required link between the elements of Penal Law § 230.34 and therefore “seriously prejudiced” the defendant.

Facts:

Defendant promoted a prostitution business by advertising online in New York and New Jersey, targeting clients and prospective “employees” through an account registered in Manhattan. Some postings offered housing, transportation, employment and financial assistant to young homeless women. One woman, JC, who was then 18-years old, responded to the ad believing there was a hostess or catering job available. She was told to bring a “club dress” to the interview, but upon arrival defendant asked JC to undress for photographs for her “portfolio.” She realized defendant was interested in sex work and asked to leave but defendant signaled to a gun and threatened to shoot or hit her if she did not comply. JC was coerced into drinking alcohol and she blacked out whereupon defendant then photographed her naked. Over the next several days, defendant threatened to physically hurt the woman and her family and circulate the nude photographs if she did not work for him as a prostitute.

Another woman, KT, responded to an online escort advertisement and began working for defendant right away. Over several months, KT performed sexual acts in Brooklyn, Queens, and New Jersey, giving defendant a portion of the money she earned. KT eventually helped manage the prostitution business by screening women who responded to the advertisements, and by telling the women where to meet clients, including in Manhattan.

Defendant was charged with promoting prostitution in the third degree and two counts of sex trafficking as to JC, as well as one count of sex trafficking as to JS, another woman who defendant was alleged to have threatened in New Jersey with public humiliation if she refused to work for his escort service.

During trial, defendant disputed whether New York had territorial jurisdiction over the sex trafficking charges against him under CPL 20.20, arguing that the coercive conduct occurred wholly in New Jersey. Defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment on that theory was denied. Defendant repeated the territorial jurisdiction argument in his motion for a trial order of dismissal, which the Supreme Court also denied. As required by law (People v McLaughlin, 80 NY2d 466 [1992]), the court submitted the territorial jurisdiction question to the jury for each sex trafficking count, charging: “The prosecution has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the State of New York has jurisdiction to prosecute the crime by proving beyond a reasonable doubt either that [defendant] engaged in conduct in the state of New York which constituted at least one element of the crime or that his conduct constituted an attempt to commit the crime in this state.”

The court then turned to the elements of the crimes charged, instructing that, “In order for you to find

[defendant]

guilty of count 1 regarding [JS], the prosecution is required to prove from all of the evidence in the case beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following: (1) That during the period from about August 1 to September 30, 2014, in New York, [defendant] advanced or profited from prostitution, (2) that he did so by using force or engaging in any scheme, plan or pattern to compel or induce [the victim] to engage in or continue to engage in prostitution activity by means of instilling a fear in her that if the demand was not complied with [defendant] or another would expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact whether true or false tending to subject her to hatred, contempt or ridicule, and (3) that [defendant] did so intentionally.”

For the count of sex trafficking as to JC based on the separate theory of threatening physical injury, the court instructed that element two was “that [defendant] did so by using force or engaging in any scheme, plan or pattern to compel or induce [JC] to engage in or continue to engage in prostitution activity by means of instilling a fear in her that if his demand was not complied with [defendant] would cause her physical injury, serious physical injury, or death.”

During deliberations, the jury sent a note that read, “Is the first element for count 1 in general or specifically for [JS]. Context: some jurors are confused around the wordings of the elements. Some mention the victim specifically, whereas element 1 of count 1 does not mention her name.”

The court consulted with the parties and indicated that it would respond that defendant “could have advanced or profited from prostitution by . . . the use of any of those women” and “[i]t is not necessarily specific to [JS].” Defense counsel raised a “global objection that ties in with the jurisdiction issue.” According to counsel, “[i]t is as if the statute is written in an over broad manner” and there was “[n]o action nexus in New York.” Over defendant’s objection, the court answered the note by rereading the first element of sex trafficking and advising the jurors that “it is not specific to anyone. . . . Where it doesn’t mention her name it means it is not specific to this person,” as long as the conduct occurred during the relevant time frame. The jury convicted defendant of the sex trafficking charges as to JC and the promoting prostitution charge, and he was sentenced to an aggregate indeterminate prison term of 6 to 18 years. The Appellate Division  affirmed the judgement.

Analysis:

The Elements of Penal Law § 230.34

Penal Law § 230.34 comprises two separate but linked elements, the first being that “a person is guilty of sex trafficking if he or she intentionally advances or profits from prostitution by…” and the second being the coercive action such person took to achieve the advancement or profit from prostitution. The Court of Appeals explained that, “because the second element requires a victim — a person who has been the target of the prohibited coercion — it follows that the first element, which can only be completed through the second, must also be linked to that same victim.” In other words, Penal Law § 230.34 has two elements that are separate but linked: the advancement or profit from prostitution must be completed through the enumerated coercive actions taken against a particular victim.

Supplemental Instructions were ‘Materially Incorrect’

The Court of Appeals explained that the lower court’s initial jury charge appropriately bridged sex trafficking’s two elements: the jury had to find, first, that defendant “advanced or profited from prostitution,” and, second, “that he did so by” his coercive threats toward JC. In their request for supplemental instructions, the jurors questioned whether the defendant’s “advances or profits” must relate to the victim of the coercive conduct. Their note invoked the interplay between the elements, as the jurors recognized that the initial sex trafficking charge linked the first and second elements, but the language of the first element, alone, did not.

The juror’s inquiry revealed “an incomplete comprehension in the minds of the jury of the elements of the crime involved” (People v Miller, 6 NY2d 152, 156 [1959]). The trial court’s response “effectively decoupled the second element from the first and removed the victim from the jury’s consideration of defendant’s prostitution enterprise altogether, thereby contradicting the court’s original charge ‘on a vital point’” (People v Malloy, 55 NY2d 296, 302 [1982], quoting People v Gonzalez, 293 NY 259, 263 [1944]). The Court of Appeals held that a proper response “necessarily” should have reiterated a link between the two elements, and concluded that ”the jurors were given an erroneous instruction which was prejudicially misleading and confusing, risking an improper resolution of both jurisdiction and defendant’s guilt of sex trafficking.” The Court reversed the order of the Appellate Division and ordered a new trial.