People v. Gordon
36 NY3d 420 (2021)
Decided on February 18, 2021
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Issue:
Whether a search warrant for a “person” and an “entire premises” authorizes a search of automobiles found on the property where the vehicles were not particularized or mentioned in the application for the search warrant or the warrant itself and were not linked to any criminal activity.
Holding:
The Court held that a search warrant for a “person” or an “entire premises” does not authorize a search for automobiles on the property under NY Const, art I, § 12 and US Const IV Amend. The warrant must be based on probable cause and describe with particularity the areas to be searched under 690.15 (a place, vehicle, or person). The failure to mention the automobiles in the search warrant and the absence of any factual connection of the automobiles to the crimes means that the search exceeded the scope of the warrant.
Facts:
Police observed Tyrone Gordon selling heroin from his home by meeting buyers in their cars on the street in front of his residence. After surveilling and making controlled buys, detectives applied for a search warrant for “the person of Tyrone Gordon and the entire premises.” As part of the search of the premises, police officers searched two vehicles found onsite and retrieved quantities of heroin, cocaine, assorted drug paraphernalia, and a loaded handgun.
Gordon was arrested and arraigned on several charges based on the evidence seized from the vehicles. Gordon moved to suppress the evidence, arguing police lacked the probable cause necessary to search the vehicles. Supreme Court granted the motion, explaining that a search warrant must list “each specific area of the building, area, of vehicle to be searched” and “probable cause must be shown in each instance” (169 AD3d 714, 714-715 [2d Dept 2019]). The Appellate Division affirmed, concurring that the search warrant did not particularize a search of the vehicles.
Analysis:
The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division properly suppressed the unlawfully seized evidence as a search warrant must be based on probable cause and must “describe with particularity the areas to be searched.” (See People v Rainey, 14 NY2nd 35, 38 [1964]).
The Court relied on several New York precedents, including People v Dumper (28 NY2d 296 [1971]), wherein the Court held that evidence seized from a vehicle that arrived on the premises during the search of those premises must be suppressed. The Court explained that “a warrant must describe the premises to be searched, and this warrant did not include the automobile” (Dumper, 28 NY2d at 299).
In People v Hansen (38 NY2d 17 [1975], the Court held that while police had sufficient cause to search Hansen’s residence after surveilling the residence and observing pipes, scales and other narcotics materials, they lacked sufficient evidence to search a vehicle that had been coming and going from the residence. They explained that “no observation was reported as to any movement of persons between the house and the van. The activity described in the affidavit, without more, was innocuous and as consistent with innocence as with criminal activity” (Hansen, 38 NY2d at 20).
In People v. Sciacca (45 NY2d 122 [1978]), the Court held that tax investigators who had a valid warrant to search an automobile exceeded the scope of that warrant by entering into a private garage in order to execute the search of the vehicle. The Court’s reasoning likewise applies when the subject of the warrant is the premises but a vehicle is searched.
Additionally, the Court cites Criminal Procedural Law Section 690.15 [1] which states: “A search warrant must direct a search of one or more of the following: a) A designated or described place or premises; b) A designated or described vehicle, as that term is defined in section 10.00 of the penal law; c) A designated or described person.”
In this case, the officers obtained a warrant for two out of three; no vehicle was designated or described by the warrant, and the legislature’s instruction “strongly suggests that a warrant which directs the search of only one category does not impliedly encompass the others.” The officers in this case failed to make a connection between the vehicles and the target of the search. The Court explains that without that connection, “allowing a search because the vehicles are located on the premises would constitute an unconstitutional bootstrapping.”
Because the constitutional requirement for particularity regarding the search of the vehicles was not met, and because the supporting affidavits do not describe allegations linking them to any criminal activity, the Court concludes that there was no probable cause to search the vehicles.