People v. Hinshaw
NY Slip Op 04816 [35 NY3d 427]
Decided on September 1, 2020
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Issue:
Lawful Vehicle Stop Based on License Plate Report Alone?
Whether police lawfully stopped defendant Hinshaw and searched his vehicle where they lacked reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred and lacked probable cause that he had completed a traffic violation, but where the officer ran a license place check that reported that the vehicle had been formerly impounded.
Holding:
License Plate Report Does Not Qualify as Probable Cause
The Court of Appeals held that police unlawfully stopped and searched Hinshaw because they lacked 1) reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred and 2) probable cause that he had completed a traffic violation, as the license plate report provided neither probable cause of a traffic violation nor reasonable suspicion that criminal behavior had occurred.
Facts:
A New York State Trooper stopped a vehicle on a street in Buffalo, though he observed no traffic violations, he saw that the inspection sticker was valid, both of the occupants were wearing their seatbelts and “everything looked good.” The trooper had run a check of the car based on the license plate which produced a response that began with a direction to “CONFIRM RECORD WITH ORIGINATOR”, listed as the Buffalo City Police Department.
The response then instructed: THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN REPORTED AS AN IMPOUNDED VEHICLE — IT SHOULD NOT BE TREATED AS A STOLEN VEHICLE HIT—NO FURTHER ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN BASED SOLELY UPON THIS IMPOUNDED RESPONSE”
The trooper stopped defendant Hinshaw, in order to “investigate further and find out what the problem [was]. Defendant’s license and registration were in order, and when the trooper asked about the impound notification, Hinshaw explained the car had been stolen previously. The trooper detected an odor of marijuana and observed a “roach” in the center console. He proceeded to search both the driver and the passenger of the vehicle and found additional marijuana on the floor of the passenger side of the car and in Mr. Hinshaw’s waistband. The trooper also found a loaded gun under the driver’s seat.
By indictment, Hinshaw was charged with second-degree criminal possession of a weapon and unlawful possession of less than an ounce of marijuana. He moved to suppress the marijuana, the gun, and his statements. At the suppression hearing, the Trooper testified that he did not attempt to confirm the information with the originator; he treated the notice as indicating the car may have been stolen; and he had stopped the car based solely on the results of the license plate check. County Court denied suppression of the physical evidence but granted suppression of defendant’s inculpatory statements that preceded a Miranda warning. Hinshaw then pled guilty to the indictment. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the “impoundment report, coupled with the Trooper’s explanation of its import, provided reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.”
Analysis:
Vehicle Stops: When Are They Lawful
Under the settled law of New York, which provides greater protections than does federal law for traffic stops, an automobile stop is lawful only when “based on probable cause that a driver has committed a traffic violation” (People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 349-350 [2001]); when based on a reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants of the vehicle have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime (People v Spencer, 84 NY2d 749, 752 [1995]; or “when conducted pursuant to ‘nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory, uniform’ highway traffic procedures” (People v Sobotker, 43 NY2d 559, 563 [1978].
Robinson Standard Precludes Discriminatory Traffic Stops
In People v Robinson, the Court held that a traffic stop did not violate the state constitution where an officer had probable cause to believe that a driver had committed a traffic violation, even though the officer’s primary motivation to stop the vehicle may have been other than the traffic violation. With Robinson, the Court validated vehicle stops even for pretextual reasons as long as “probable cause existed warranting a stop of the vehicle for a valid traffic infraction,” and explained that “discriminatory law enforcement has no place in our law” (Robinson at 353). Correspondingly, suspicion-less traffic stops—such as sobriety checkpoints—are lawful in New York only when conducted in a “uniform and nondiscriminatory manner” (Matter of Muhammad F., 94 NY2d 136, 145-146 [1999]).
Therefore, “in order for a traffic stop to pass constitutional muster, before making the stop, ‘a police officer (must have) probable cause to believe that the driver of an automobile has committed a traffic violation’’ (People v Washburn, 309 AD2d 1270, 1271 [4th Dept 2003]). The trooper in this case did not observe any violations of the Vehicle and Traffic Law and “everything looked good.” The trooper testified that he had no reason to stop the defendant aside from the license plate inquiry, which he speculated could have been impounded for “registration…problems” or “the plates could have been suspended,” “insurance could have been suspended,” etc.
But the Court held that the trooper’s speculations were insufficient basis for the traffic stop: that the defendant’s car had recently been impounded by the Buffalo Police Department did not provide the trooper with reasonable suspicion of criminality. Cars are commonly towed for non-criminal reasons such as unpaid parking tickets, and parking in “no parking” zones. Reasonable suspicion “may not rest on equivocal or ‘innocuous behavior’ that is susceptible of an innocent as well as a culpable interpretation (People v Brannon, 16 NY3d 596, 602 [2011]). The Court held, then, that the stop of defendant’s vehicle was invalid. The order of the Appellate Division was reversed, Hinshaw’s motion to suppress was granted in its entirety, and the indictment was dismissed.