Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
People v Maffei
NY Slip Op 02680
Decided on September 2, 2020
Issue:
Whether defendant is entitled to relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel failed to challenge a prospective juror for his alleged bias where juror during voir dire admitted to having read about the incident in the newspaper and had made up his mind as to defendant’s guilt.
Holding:
The Court of Appeals held that based on the record, defendant failed to sustain his burden to establish that counsel was constitutionally ineffective; the appropriate litigation procedure is a CPL 440.10 motion that would allow additional sworn factual allegations and evidentiary hearings on the matter.
Facts:
In 2006, Defendant was charged with depraved indifference murder after the victim was shot in the head and killed in a drive-by shooting. During the prosecutor’s voir dire in round one, he summarized the facts of the case and began asking whether the jurors could be impartial. Juror 10 asked to speak and said, “I think I read about this in the papers…Kind of made up my mind then.” Upon further questioning the juror stated that he did not like the circumstances and that he, “remember[ed] reading about it, making a decision kind of in [his] own head at that time.” The prosecutor then affirmed that the juror understood that it was the prosecutor’s job to prove who committed the crime, and he asked if the juror could remain fair and impartial. Juror 10 responded, “I hope so.” The trial court then reminded the juror that he needed to answer equivocally, to which he responded, “I’m not sure.”
Defense counsel then conducted his portion of the voir dire, asking questions as to impartiality and relationships with law enforcement. Counsel then asked the jurors to show their hands if they “as an individual, do not believe that the District Attorney has proven this case to you belong a reasonable doubt” they could “stick to the courage of [their] conviction” and vote for acquittal. Two jurors did not raise their hands. The prosecutor then exercised three peremptory challenges, and, after conferring off the record with the defendant, defense counsel did the same. Juror 10 was seated as a juror.
Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, and on appeal defendant argued that his counsel’s failure to challenge prospective juror 10 constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed, reasoning that it was based in part of matters dehors the record and that “a CPL 440.10 proceeding is the appropriate forum for reviewing the claim in its entirety.
Analysis:
Defendant Bears Burden to Prove Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Under both the New York and federal standards, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, which is met where a defendant was not afforded “meaningful representation” based on “the evidence, the law and the circumstances of [the] particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of representation” (People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]). To prove ineffective assistance, defendant must demonstrate that counsel did not act consistently with a “reasonably competent attorney.” A single error can constitute ineffective assistance, “but only when it sufficiently egregious and prejudicial as to compromise a defendant’s right to a fair trial” (People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005]).
CPL 440.10 Motions
The Court of Appeals explained that ineffective assistance claims are not generally demonstrable on the main record, but require consideration of factual issues not adequately reflected in the record (People v Brown, 45 NY2d 852, 853 [1978]). The legislature crafted a procedure for such scenarios by copying the writ of error coram nobis in CPL article 440, which permits defendants to complete the record by putting forth sworn factual allegations in support of a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction and authorizes evidentiary hearings on those motions. These investigations are vital to a defendant’s claim when the record is inadequate to determine whether there was error that deprived the defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial. Indeed, “in the typical case it would be better, and in some cases essential, that an appellate attack on the effectiveness of counsel be bottomed on an evidentiary exploration by collateral or post-conviction proceeding brought under CPL 440.10” (Brown, 45 NY2d at 853-854.)
Nevertheless, defendant argued that the voir dire record reveals that prospective juror number 10 harbored an actual bias against him, citing the juror’s statements that he had “made up his mind,” and that he “didn’t like the circumstances.” Defendant contended that the juror’s failure to unequivocally guarantee his impartiality violated Maffei’s right to a fair trial and is sufficiently egregious to constitute ineffective assistance.
But the Court rejected defendant’s argument and explained that actual bias is one that precludes a juror from rending an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at trial, a determination which turns on whether jurors have a preference for one side that affects their decision making. The Court has held that “a prospective juror whose statements raise a serious doubt regarding the ability to be impartial must be excused [by the trial court] unless the juror states unequivocally on the record that he or she can be fair and impartial” (People v Harris, 19 NY3d 679, 685 [2012], quoting People v Chambers, 97 NY2d 417, 419 [2002]). The court does not require that jurors be ignorant to the facts of a case, especially given “these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of communication.” (Irwin v Dowd, 366 US 717, 722-723 [1961]).
Although juror 10 at first equivocated as to his impartiality, upon further questioning he said that he would “go by the law.” Both prosecutor and defense counsel questioned the jurors and excused other jurors who failed to confirm their ability to acquit if the prosecutor did not prove defendant committed the crime. When viewed in totality, the voir dire record does not show “a substantial risk that the prospective juror would not properly discharge his responsibilities nor does it cast doubt on his ability to be fair.” (People v Barboni, 21 NY3d 292, 407 [2013]). The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division and reiterated that a CPL 440.10 motion is the proper mechanism for litigating the claim.