Can a Plea Agreement Waive Participation in the Shock Incarceration Program? ​

People v. Silva Santos 2025 NY Slip Op 01008 Decided February 20. 2025

New York Court of Appeals

Legal Issue:

The central legal issue in People v. Santos is whether a waiver of eligibility for the Shock Incarceration Program as part of a plea agreement violates public policy or statutory authority. ​ The case raises important questions about the balance between prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining and the statutory authority granted to the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) to administer rehabilitative programs. ​

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Facts of the Case

Juan M. Silva Santos was indicted on charges including major drug trafficking, conspiracy, and criminal possession of controlled substances. ​ He accepted a plea bargain, pleading guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, a class B felony, in exchange for a reduced sentence of nine years in prison and two years of post-release supervision. ​ As part of the plea agreement, Santos signed a waiver stating that he would not apply for participation in the Shock Incarceration Program during his incarceration. ​

At sentencing, Santos expressed remorse and requested enrollment in the Shock program, citing his struggles with substance abuse and his family circumstances, including a young daughter with severe autism. ​ However, the court denied his request, stating that the waiver was a condition of the plea agreement. ​ Santos appealed, arguing that the waiver was illegal and contrary to public policy. ​

Court’s Holding

The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the waiver of Shock program participation was not a component of the sentence and therefore did not violate statutory authority or public policy. ​ The court reasoned that the waiver did not direct DOCCS to impose a particular form of punishment or prohibit DOCCS from calculating Santos’s sentence in a specific manner. ​ The court emphasized that the waiver’s impact on the duration of Santos’s sentence was speculative, as it depended on his decision to apply for the program, DOCCS’s discretion to approve the application, and his successful completion of the program. ​

The dissenting opinion, however, argued that such waivers undermine the public policy favoring rehabilitation and contradict the legislature’s intent to expand access to rehabilitative programming. ​ The dissent contended that allowing prosecutors to condition plea agreements on Shock waivers infringes on DOCCS’s statutory authority and the broader societal interest in reducing recidivism. ​

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Applicable Law

Correction Law § 865 ​

This statute establishes the Shock Incarceration Program, a six-month, bootcamp-style program designed to rehabilitate eligible incarcerated individuals through rigorous physical activity, discipline, and substance abuse treatment. ​ Eligibility is determined by DOCCS, and successful completion of the program can lead to early release. ​

Correction Law § 867

This provision outlines the application process for Shock participation, allowing eligible inmates to apply within three years of their earliest release date. ​ DOCCS has discretion to approve applications and terminate participation for individuals who fail to meet program requirements. ​

Penal Law § 60.04(7)

This statute allows courts to order Shock participation for eligible individuals, expanding access to the program beyond DOCCS’s discretion. ​

People v. Nieves (2 NY3d 310, 2004) ​

This case established that certain waivers, such as orders of protection, are not components of a sentence and therefore do not violate statutory authority. ​

People v. Muniz (91 NY2d 570, 1998) ​

This case held that waivers infringing on public policy or statutory authority are unenforceable, emphasizing the importance of evaluating the broader societal impact of such waivers. ​

Key Terms for Better Understanding

  1. Shock Incarceration Program: A six-month rehabilitative program involving physical activity, discipline, and substance abuse treatment, aimed at reducing recidivism and promoting early release.
  2. DOCCS: The Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, responsible for administering the Shock program and other rehabilitative initiatives. ​
  3. Waiver: A voluntary relinquishment of a right, often included in plea agreements as a condition for reduced charges or sentences. ​
  4. Recidivism: The tendency of a convicted criminal to reoffend after release from incarceration. ​
  5. Public Policy: Principles and standards that guide legislative and judicial decisions to promote the welfare of society. ​
  6. Plea Agreement: A negotiated deal between a defendant and prosecutor in which the defendant pleads guilty to lesser charges in exchange for a reduced sentence. ​
  7. Determinate Sentence: A fixed prison term imposed by the court, as opposed to an indeterminate sentence with a range of years. ​
  8. Rehabilitation: The process of helping incarcerated individuals develop skills and behaviors that reduce the likelihood of reoffending. ​
  9. Statutory Authority: Legal power granted to government agencies or officials by legislation.
  10. Illegal Sentence: A sentence that violates statutory or constitutional provisions, making it subject to challenge. ​

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Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

Majority Opinion ​

The majority focused on the technical distinction between a waiver and a sentence component. ​ It held that the Shock waiver was not part of Santos’s sentence and therefore did not violate statutory authority. ​ The court emphasized that the waiver’s impact on Santos’s sentence was speculative, as it depended on multiple factors, including his decision to apply for Shock and DOCCS’s discretion to approve his application. ​

Dissenting Opinion ​

The dissent argued that Shock waivers undermine the legislature’s intent to expand access to rehabilitative programming and reduce recidivism. ​ It emphasized that DOCCS, not prosecutors, has statutory authority to determine Shock eligibility. ​ The dissent also highlighted the broader societal interest in rehabilitation, contending that plea-induced waivers of Shock participation contradict public policy. ​

Broader Implications

Impact on Plea Bargaining ​

The case raises concerns about the extent to which prosecutors can condition plea agreements on waivers of rehabilitative programming. ​ While plea agreements are a valuable tool for resolving cases efficiently, they should not infringe on statutory authority or public policy. ​

Rehabilitation and Public Policy ​

The dissent’s emphasis on rehabilitation aligns with the legislature’s intent to use programs like Shock to reduce recidivism and save taxpayer dollars. ​ Allowing waivers of Shock participation may undermine these goals, particularly for individuals who could benefit from the program’s substance abuse treatment and life skills training. ​

Future Challenges

The dissent suggested that the validity of Shock waivers could be challenged through other procedural vehicles, such as declaratory judgment actions or injunctive relief. ​ These challenges could provide an opportunity to revisit the public policy implications of such waivers. ​

Conclusion

The decision in People v. Santos highlights the tension between prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining and the statutory authority granted to DOCCS to administer rehabilitative programs. ​ While the majority upheld the validity of Shock waivers, the dissent raised compelling arguments about their impact on public policy and rehabilitation. As the debate over Shock waivers continues, courts and policymakers must carefully consider the broader societal implications of limiting access to rehabilitative programming.