Decided February 9, 2023
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Issue:
Whether a defendant may be restrained during the reading of the verdict as it might have some effect on the polling of the jury after the verdict is read.
Holding:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits states from physically restraining a defendant during a criminal trial
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits states from physically restraining a defendant during a criminal trial without an on-the-record, individualized assessment of the “state interest specific to a particular trial” (Deck, 544 US at 628-629, 632; see also People v Clyde, 18 NY3d 145, 153 [2011]). A trial court therefore has a constitutional obligation to conduct “close judicial scrutiny” before ordering a defendant restrained (Holbrook v Flynn, 475 US 560, 568 [1986] [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Estelle v Williams, 425 US 501, 504 [1976]). It is undisputed that no such scrutiny occurred here and therefore the trial judge committed a constitutional error by ordering defendant handcuffed without placing the special need for such restraints on the record. Deck v Missouri, 544 US 622, 626 [2005])
Under the applicable harmless error standard, we cannot say that this constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (see Clyde, 18 NY3d at 153-154; see also People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237-238 [1975]). The error here requires reversal of defendant’s conviction and a new trial (see People v Williams, 25 NY3d 185, 195 [2015]). Our decision renders defendant’s remaining claims academic (see e.g. People v Murray, 39 NY3d 10, 16 [2022]). Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and a new trial ordered.
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Facts of the Case:
In People v Sanders, the Court of Appeals in New York considered the use of restraints on a defendant during the jury’s announcement of its verdict and the court’s polling of jurors. The defendant, Oscar Sanders, was tried before a jury and convicted of attempted assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, and criminal contempt. When the jury advised the court that it had reached a verdict, defense counsel observed Sanders in handcuffs. The court officer directed everyone to stand as the jury entered, and the trial judge ordered Sanders to stand for the reading of the verdict. Sanders was found guilty, and the court confirmed the verdict by polling the jurors. Sanders was subsequently sentenced to an aggregate term of 15 years to life imprisonment.
On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, reasoning that any error in Sanders being handcuffed during the rendition of the verdict and the polling of the jury was harmless. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the trial judge violated the constitutional due process prohibition on the use of visible restraints during the guilt phase of a trial without a special need. The court noted that the trial judge had not provided an on-the-record, individualized explanation for the restraints, which constituted a constitutional error. Because this error was not harmless, it required the reversal of Sanders’ conviction and a new trial.
The court explained that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits states from physically restraining a defendant during a criminal trial without an on-the-record, individualized assessment of the state interest specific to a particular trial. A trial court has a constitutional obligation to conduct close judicial scrutiny before ordering a defendant restrained. It is undisputed that no such scrutiny occurred in this case, and therefore, the trial judge committed a constitutional error by ordering Sanders handcuffed without placing the special need for such restraints on the record.
The prosecution’s claim that the constitutional prohibition against restraint does not apply during the reading of the jury verdict and polling of individual jurors was meritless. The court explained that Deck v Missouri, which involved the application of the constitutional prohibition against restraint during the punishment phase of a capital case, necessarily occurred after the guilty verdict had been entered. The reading of the verdict is an integral part of the guilt-determination phase, and therefore, the constitutional prohibition against restraint applies during the jury’s announcement of its verdict and the court’s polling of jurors.
The court rejected the prosecution’s argument that any error was harmless. The court noted that the use of visible restraints is inherently prejudicial because it can suggest to the jury that the defendant is dangerous, guilty, or deserving of punishment. Moreover, the court explained that even if the jurors had reached their verdict before they entered the courtroom, the use of restraints could still have influenced their responses during the polling process. The court observed that defense counsel had articulated a specific concern about the influence of restraints during polling, which the trial judge had failed to address. Therefore, the court held that the error in using restraints was not harmless and required the reversal of Sanders’ conviction and a new trial.